Protecting the Right of Citizens to Aggregate Small Claims against Businesses by Carrington, Paul D.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 46
2013 
Protecting the Right of Citizens to Aggregate Small Claims 
against Businesses 
Paul D. Carrington 
Duke University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Litigation 
Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul D. Carrington, Protecting the Right of Citizens to Aggregate Small Claims against Businesses, 46 U. 
MICH. J. L. REFORM 537 (2013). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol46/iss2/6 
 
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO AGGREGATE
SMALL CLAIMS AGAINST BUSINESSES
Paul D. Carrington*
Two years ago I ranted against the Supreme Court's subversion
of the Rules Enabling Act and its opposition to the benign aims of
the twentieth-century progressive law reformers expressed summa-
rily in Rule 1 of our Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' I observed
then that the majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court
appeared to have joined the Chamber of Commerce, aligning
themselves also with Vice President Dan Quayle's 1989 Council on
Competitiveness 2 that denounced effective civil procedure as an en-
emy of economic development.3 I was then commenting adversely
on what the Court had done to transform Rule 8.4 I renewed my
* Professor of Law, Duke University; Reporter to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee,
1986-1993. The paper was presented to a Committee meeting in Ann Arbor, Michigan on
March 22, 2012. Helpful comments on an earlier draft were received from Steven Burbank,
Arthur Miller, and Martin Redish.
1. Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60
DUKE LJ. 597 (2010). That paper was presented to a Committee meeting in Durham, North
Carolina on May 11, 2010. It reflected prior thinking about the Supreme Court more fully
expressed in Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving
theJudicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587 (2009). And it was a salute to the
late Richard Arnold-in my view, the wisest judge to sit on a federal bench in my time. See
also DAVID R. Dow, AMERICA'S PROPHETS: How JUDICIAL ACrVISM MAKES AMERICA GREAT
(2009); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008); ROBERT F. NAGEL, UNRESTRAINED: JUDICIAL EXCESS AND THE
MIND OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER (2008); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE:
THE MORAL DIMENSION OFJUDICIAL DECISION (2008); Margaret L. Moses, Beyond Judicial Activ-
ism: When the Supreme Court Is No Longer a Court, 14 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 161 (2011). Rule I of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, "These rules govern the procedure in all civil
actions and proceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81. They
should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action and proceeding." See FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
2. Vice President Quayle was assigned the task of leading this federally funded council
in 1989, and it mounted a political assault on the Federal Rules. See Nancy Watzman & Chris-
tine Triano, Defund Quayle's Autocratic Competiveness Council, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1992, http:/
/articles.latimes.com/1992-06-24/local/me-697_1_competitiveness-council. The Council sur-
vived defunding in 1993. For its current status, see Council on Competitiveness, COMPETE.ORG,
http://www.compete.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2012).
3. See David Margolick, Address by Quayle on Justice Proposals Irks Bar Association, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al. For his account of his presentation, see DAN QUAYLE, STANDING
FIRM 282-90 (1994).
4. For the Court's transformation of Rule 8 pleading requirements, see Ashcroft v.
lqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). For another take
on the impact of these cases, see Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of "General
Rules,"2009 Wis. L. REV. 535.
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accusation last year 5 in South Carolina while commenting on the
Court's ruling protecting a manufacturer from the local enforce-
ment of New Jersey tort law by shortening the reach of that state's
courts' jurisdiction over the claim of a local plaintiff who sought
compensation for an injury caused by the defendant's negligent
construction of a tool shipped to New Jersey with the help of its
insolvent marketing distributor.6 Now, for the third time in two
years, I find myself protesting the Court's identification with the
Quayle Commission and the Chamber of Commerce in its 2011
subversion of Rule 23(b) (3), which provides for the aggregation of
small claims.
7
Rule 1, which the Justices might usefully read again, simply ex-
presses the progressive aim of our Rules of Civil Procedure to
assure the enforcement of the private rights not only of major busi-
ness firms but also those of small merchants, franchisees, consum-
ers, employees, debtors, patients, passengers, and others who
advance claims in federal district courts under state and federal law.
As I emphasized on that 2010 occasion, our Rules as crafted in 1938
should be seen as an expression of twentieth-century progressive
politics first brought to bear on the law of civil procedure by Roscoe
Pound's celebrated address to the American Bar Association (ABA)
meeting in St. Paul in 1906.8 It took a while to work out the details,
but our 1938 Civil Rules were designed to enable private citizens
represented by private counsel to enforce their rights without de-
pendence on public officials regulating the firms who sell them
goods or services, lend them money, or employ them. Rules 26-37,
providing for private investigation of the facts (i.e., discovery), were
the crucial feature of this scheme of private law enforcement. And
5. Paul D. Carrington, Business Interests and the Long Arm in 2011, 63 S.C. L. REv. 637
(2012); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors: October Term 2010, 14 GREEN
BAG 2D 375, 389 (2011) ("One way of interpreting these decisions, and others like them, is
that the conservative Justices are simply pro-business and pro-prosecutor and are denying
access to the courts to consumers, employees, and criminal defendants. This certainly ex-
plains the rulings.") (footnote omitted); Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal
Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REv. 465 (2012); Alan B. Morrison, The Impacts of McIntyre on Minimum
Contacts, 80 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. ARGUENDO 1 (2011), available at http://groups.law.gwu.edu/
LR/ArticlePDF/MorrisonSMEArguendo.pdf.
6. For the Court's full opinion, seeJ. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780
(2011).
7. For examples of the Court's "subversion" of Rule 23(b) (3), see Marmet Health Care
Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam) (vacating a West Virginia decision
holding an arbitration clause signed by a relative of a nursing home patient to be uncon-
scionable); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
8. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofJustice, 29
A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 241, 273-91 (1964); see also Barry Friedman,
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofJustice: A Retrospective (and a Look Ahead), 82 IND.
L.J. 1193 (2007).
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in short order these rules were, with some modifications, adopted
as the model for civil procedure in state courts.9
Business interests, it is fair to say, have seldom expressed enthusi-
asm for investigative discovery of their business practices by mere
citizen plaintiffs. And their legitimate concerns have been elevated
by enhancements of technology that have increased the cost of dis-
closures.10 And so in 1986, our Justices, responsive to the concerns
of the Chamber of Commerce, made some extravagant interpreta-
tions of Rule 56, the summary-judgment rule; those interpretations
narrowed the window of discovery opened by Rules 26-37. 11 These
confining reinterpretations of Rule 56 apparently did not have all
the effect seemingly intended, for the frequency of summary judg-
ment appears not to have materially increased) 2 So, it seems, in
2009 the Court turned to Rule 8 to encourage the use ofjudgments
on the pleadings to close windows of discovery.
13
Notwithstanding many protests about what the Court has done to
rewrite Rules 56 and 8 to protect business interests from the revela-
tion of evidence making them accountable in civil actions,' 4 the
Court has since that 2010 meeting moved on to diminish the availa-
bility of the small-claims class action established in Rule 23 (b) (3) as
a deterrence of unlawful business practices. 15 This is a third subver-
sion of the purpose of the Civil Rules as stated in Rule 1. And it
9. See FED. R. Cir. P. 26-37; see generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Com-
mon Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909
(1987) (giving the historical context of the 1938 Civil Rules concerning discovery).
10. See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561
(2001).
11. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
On the relation to preexisting trends, see Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary
Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 591 (2004).
12. See Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal
District Courts, 4J. EMPItuCAL LEGAL STUD. 861 (2007).
13. See sources cited supra note 4.
14. See Steven Alan Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the
Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183 (1987);Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has
There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NoTRE DAME L. Rav. 770 (1988); Samuel Is-
sacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73
(1990); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability
Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 982 (2003); Melissa L. Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment After
Celotex, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 53 (1988); D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolu-
tion: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK.
L. REv. 35 (1988).
15. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 n.7 (2011); see also
Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2012); Quilloin v. Tenet Health Sys. Phila.,
Inc., 673 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2012).
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seems likely to have more consequence than the subversions of
Rules 56 and 8.
I note that Rule 23(b) (3) was drafted and approved by a unani-
mous Advisory Committee appointed by the Chief Justice that
included several lawyers from large firms representing large busi-
ness clients. It was recommended by the Judicial Conference, unan-
imously promulgated by the Court, and accepted by Congress
without objection in 1966.16 Its stated aim was to facilitate the en-
forcement of rights offended on too small a scale to make a resort
to law enforcement by private, contingent-fee lawyers economical.
And that rule, allowing aggregation of small claims, was admired
and soon replicated in many state courts and even in foreign coun-
tries seeking to protect citizens from various forms of commercial
greed such as securities fraud.
17
The idea of Rule 23(b) (3) was first envisioned in 1941 by scholar
Harry Kalven, who observed that many business decisions are made
in the secure knowledge that multiple harms resulting to many dis-
tant others may be too small in their financial consequences to
make civil actions enforcing the law economically justified.' 8 So a
big firm that can, for example, cheat many thousands of prospec-
tive plaintiffs out of thirty or so dollars each need not worry that the
law of fraud might be effectively enforced to seriously diminish
their profits.
Kalven's insight might be viewed in the light of the eighteenth-
century observation of Adam Smith, the saint of marketplace eco-
nomics, who observed that humans, such as big business executives,
may care a little, but not much, about harms experienced by distant
others with whom they have no personal contact. 19
Rule 23(b) (3) was thus written in the spirit of Rule 1 to enable
private citizens to enforce law by aggregating small claims to make
16. This occurred in the conference room of Covington & Burling LLP in Washington,
D.C., where the Advisory Committee was sitting as guests of Committee member Dean Ache-
son. At the time, the class-action enlargement was not presented as a major political reform.
See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 386-87 (1967) (describing the formulation of
revised Federal Rule 23).
17. For a current example, see Noam Noked, A New Playbook for Global Securities Litigation
and Regulation, HARv. L. SCH. F. ON CoR'. GOVERNANCE & FIN. RAG. (Feb. 2, 2012, 9:53 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/02/02/a-new-playbook-for-global-securities-liti
gation-and-regulation/,
18. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. CHI. L. REv. 684 (1941).
19. SeeADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SEwrIMErrs 136 (Oxford 1976) (1759) (re-
counting the relative indifference of his Glasgow neighbors to distant tragedies); see also
DOGAN GOCMEN, THE ADAM SMITH PROBLEM: HUMAN NATURE AND SocIETr IN THE THEORY OF
MORAL SENTIMENTS AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 36 (2007).
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the total sum in dispute worth the bother and expense of a lawsuit.
Such individual plaintiffs and their counsel serve the public good
by providing protection of fellow citizens from otherwise inevitable
business practices that distribute minor harms to thousands.
Indeed, it may be in a sense the professional duty of a corporate
executive to her shareholders to cheat a few million distant others
out of sums so small that they cannot be worth the cost for the
victims to seek compensation. Of course, it is the professional duty
of business lawyers, if permitted, to write contracts for their clients
that will protect them from the threat of enforcement of the law by
private plaintiffs. They have the opportunity to write many stan-
dard-form contracts that are not negotiated but imposed on parties
with whom their clients deal. And so we have mandatory arbitration
clauses written into standard form contracts that a mere consumer,
debtor, patient, employee, franchisee, or the like will not read or
understand and that will serve to preclude their access to courts.
We were told by the Supreme Court in 2011 that the mandatory
arbitration clause may be used to prevent the aggregation in court
of small claims pursuant to Rule 23(b) (3).2o Never mind the appli-
cable state law of contracts that treats such a use of printed arbitra-
tion clauses as unconscionable and thus void.
21
Candor requires that I confess that my interest in mandatory ar-
bitration clauses reflects professional engagements that confirm my
views on the subject. Not only have I joined in repeated academic
protests against the misuse of arbitration clauses in standard-form
contracts to deter claims,22 but I have twice served as a paid lobbyist
to direct the attention of Congress to such misuses. In 2000, I repre-
sented the National Automobile Dealers Association to object to ar-
bitration clauses written into franchise agreements to deprive
dealers seeking to enforce the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court
Act23 of their access to discovery or a local jury. Republican Senator
Orrin Hatch bought our argument and secured an amendment to
the Day in Court Act to assure the access of dealers to federal
courts. 24 And in 2007, I represented an organization of small farm-
ers who objected to mandatory arbitration of their disputes with the
food producers who buy all their production pursuant to printed
20. AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
21. See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
22. E.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. CT.
REv. 331 (1996).
23. Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act (ADDCA) of 1956, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225
(2006).
24. Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 1140, 107th Cong.
(2001).
WINTER 2013]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
contracts. This time, it was Republican Senator Chuck Grassley who
secured an amendment liberating farmers from arbitration on the
terms dictated by the producer unless the farmer freely and explic-
itly approved the terms separately from a signing of a standard-form
contract.
25
I have, of course, not been alone in protesting the abuse of the
Federal Arbitration Act. Historians point to the documents of the
time to demonstrate the modesty of the aim of Congress in enact-
ing that law.26 That aim was simply to protect arbitration clauses
included in negotiated interstate business transactions from rulings
by federal judges, who in 1925 seemed prone to invoke their judi-
cial authority derived from the parties' diversity of citizenship to
make a federal common law invalidating all arbitration agreements
ousting the judges' own jurisdiction that were made prior to the
emergence of the dispute to be arbitrated, even if the terms were
enforceable in state courts. There was no strong "national policy
favoring arbitration" until the Supreme Court took it upon itself to
re-read the Act in the 1980s and declare that strong "national policy
favoring arbitration. '27 Never mind the original intent of the 1925
Congress.
The Justices in 2011 have invoked their strong "national policy"
to prevent the aggregation of small claims.28 They have thus dis-
abled effective private enforcement of many laws made to protect
citizens other than farmers or auto dealers. The case decided by the
Court was exactly the kind envisioned by the generation of lawyers
and judges who made Rule 23(b) (3). The plaintiffs in Concepcion
had bought a telephone service that the phone company said came
with a free phone. But then the plaintiffs were unexpectedly billed
$30.22 as a sales tax on that "free" phone. The same scam was in-
cluded in many thousands of phone service transactions. The
phone company knew that very few consumers would bother to
contest a thirty-dollar tax bill, even though they were told that the
phone would be free and might be annoyed to be billed for that
sum. Enforcing the law of fraud in such circumstances is, for most
25. An amended version of Grassley's original bill, Fair Contracts for Growers Act of
2007, S. 221, 110th Cong. (2007), was enacted as part of the Food, Conservation, and Energy
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 11005, 122 Stat. 1356-58 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C.A. § 197a (West 2012)).
26. See, e.g., IAN R. MAcNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION-NATiONALZA-
TION-INTERNATIONALIZATION 92-113 (1992).
27. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
28. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011).
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consumers, clearly not worth the bother, as Harry Kalven observed
long ago.
29
The Concepcions brought their action on behalf of the entire
class of consumers who had been disappointed to receive a thirty-
dollar tax bill. The telephone company pointed to the arbitration
clause in their printed contract. Among the features of the unno-
ticed arbitration clause was an agreement not to aggregate the
plaintiffs claims with those of other consumers similarly cheated.
The plaintiffs replied that the clause was clearly unconscionable
under the applicable California law3 0 because it prevented effective
enforcement of the state's law protecting consumers from small
frauds. The Ninth Circuit agreed.
31
Justice Scalia ruled for the majority that the 1925 Federal Arbitra-
tion Act barred California from enforcing its state contract law
against the contractual preclusion of small claim aggregation as
unconscionable and void. 32 Never mind the text of Rule 23(b) (3)
providing for aggregation of such claims or the language of Rule 1
favoring enforcement of state law protecting the rights of citizens.
Never mind the explicit provision of that 1925 Act denying the en-
forceability of an arbitration clause "upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."3 3 Also never
mind if thousands of other purchasers of telephone service were
each cheated out of thirty dollars. Let the phone company keep
their money if the inattentive purchasers failed to strike the arbitra-
tion clause from their printed purchase agreements and now do
not have the funds and energy needed to sue for the mere thirty
dollars.
Justice Breyer's dissent was joined, as one should expect, by his
three colleagues who have joined in resisting what I have described
as the Quayle Commission or Chamber of Commerce reforms of
federal civil procedure. 34 Breyer noted that the telephone company
could have provided for the aggregation of claims in arbitration.
35
29. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 18, at 684.
30. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Cuda, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012). For the California
law, see CAL. Cwv. CODE §§ 1668, 1670.5(a) (West 2012).
31. AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1747; Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849
(9th Cir. 2009).
32. Laster, 584 F.3d at 855.
33. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
34. See David E. Bernstein & Josh Blackman, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer Shows
Progressive Streak, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER (July 12, 2011, 5:55 AM), http://blog.nj.com/njv_-
guest.blog/2011/07/supremecourtjustice_stephen.html.
35. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1756-62 (2011). The Court had
recently held that arbitrators could not conduct a class arbitration in the absence of a provi-
sion in the arbitration clause empowering them to do so. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal
Feeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
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In making this point, his dissent drew on amicus briefs filed by arbi-
tration firms eager to perform the mission of resolving disputes ag-
gregated in the Rule 23 manner in order to assure effective law
enforcement.36 Justice Scalia dismissed this consideration on the
ground that class arbitration would be more expensive than arbitra-
tion of each small claim advanced by an individual plaintiff, and so
the telephone company should not be compelled to take that
course.37 What would make the class action truly more expensive is
that all the purchasers' rights might be enforced instead ofjust one.
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's caution, lower federal courts have
found implicit authority for arbitrators to conduct class
arbitrations.38
The consequences of the Court's holding will be substantial de-
spite such cautions. Good lawyers will write class action waiver provi-
sions into countless consumer and employment contracts, and
countless citizens will be cheated out of thirty dollars here and
thirty dollars there. And no one will be able to do anything about it
until we change the law made by the Court.
To be fair, as Suzanna Sherry has emphasized, the dispute resolu-
tion clause in the printed contract was, in some respects, unusually
generous. It obligated AT&T to pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims
and promised (1) that arbitration must take place in the county in
which the customer is billed; (2) that for claims of $10,000 or less,
the customer may choose whether the arbitration proceeds in per-
son, by telephone, or based only on submissions; and (3) that
either party may bring a claim in small claims court in lieu of arbi-
tration. The agreement, moreover, denies AT&T any opportunity to
seek reimbursement of its attorney's fees, and, in the event that a
customer receives an arbitration award greater than AT&T's last
written settlement offer, it requires AT&T to pay a $7,500 minimum
recovery and twice the amount of the claimant's attorney's fees.
These provisions seem very generous and on their face are quite
"conscionable." 39 But they do not disguise the fact that AT&T is
seeking to escape from the risk that the small rights of all its cus-
tomers might be enforced by a private plaintiff invoking Rule
36. E.g., Brief for Am. Arbitration Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party,
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 08-1198).
37. See AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (2011).
38. See, e.g., Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2012); Jock v.
Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2011). Both courts distinguished the Stolt-Nielsen
case on the ground that the parties had stipulated that there was no authorization in the
arbitration clause. See Sutter, 646 F.3d at 222-23; Jock, 646 F.3d at 123.
39. See Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 Sup. CT. REv. 1
(2011).
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23(b) (3) or similar state law.40 And, of course, AT&T would never
pay the promised $7,500 merely to avoid a thirty-dollar lawsuit.
Claimants who file for thirty dollars will be compensated, but not
those who do not.
I note that the NLRB 41 and the SEC42 have each adopted rules
forbidding the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment
contracts or investment agreements in their jurisdictions. There is
also a possibility that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
created by the Dodd-Frank bill might bar the use of mandatory arbi-
tration clauses aimed to prevent aggregation of small claims against
bankers. 43 But it is easily imaginable that five Justices will hold that
all such rules of administrative law also violate the 1925 Federal Ar-
bitration Act. It seems that if Congress and the American people
want to regulate business effectively to protect citizens from harms
caused by the indifference to their welfare of the distant executives
of business firms of size, they may need to confer more regulatory
power and responsibility on the executive branch and its adminis-
trative agencies. But it may be that the Chamber will successfully
contend that the 1925 Act as rewritten by the Court trumps the
later enactments of laws empowering the administrative agencies to
bar the misuse of arbitration clauses.
There is also the possibility of class actions in state courts. Califor-
nia's Private Attorney General Act of 200444 establishes a procedure
closely resembling the Rule 23 class action. It has been held that a
private attorney general cannot be required to comply with an arbi-
tration clause imposed on fellow workers because he or she repre-
sents the public, and the public cannot be barred from law
enforcement because of a waiver by a prospective victim of a breach
40. Professor Sherry has emphasized that these provisions justify a Supreme Court rever-
sal of the California court's decision on the ground that the clause is clearly "conscionable."
See id. She is right that a holding based on that ground would have spared us the conse-
quences of a holding that invites the universal use of arbitration clauses to delete Rule
23(b) (3). But all that this would accomplish would be the universalization of the use of
elegant provisions to trump Rule 23(b) (3). It would not be likely to result in effective en-
forcement of small claims such as those advanced by the Concepcions. One may agree with
Professor Sherry that the plaintiffs were "overreaching" in the contemporaneous case of Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2541
passim.
41. See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Cuda, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012).
42. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 921, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010).
43. See David Lazarus, Consumer Bureau May Have Final Say on Arbitration Clauses, L.A.
TIMES, May 1, 2012, at Bi.
44. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699 (West 2011).
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of a public law.45 And perhaps Congress might be induced to recon-
sider its Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 that aimed to remove
class actions from state courts to federal courts when the diversity
jurisdiction might be invoked.46 The aim of that law has been seri-
ously impaired by the Court's holding in Concepcion.
In any case, if the purpose stated in Rule 1 is to be faithfully
pursued by federal courts, the time has come to consider the need
for a law reform proscribing the validity of mandatory contract pro-
visions imposed on consumers, patients, franchisees, or others that
are meant to prevent the aggregation of small claims as provided in
Rule 23(b) (3). That is, for the moment, a task for consideration by
the institutions established by the Rules Enabling Act and empow-
ered to propose reforms to the Court and Congress. They must face
the risk that the Court might then reject their proposal as a rule of
substantive contract law and thus not one within their authority
under the Rules Enabling Act. But it would seem that such a ruling
by the Court rejecting an amendment by the Judicial Conference
would serve to elevate the interest of Congress in addressing the
issue posed by the Concepcions.
If the Conference fails to revive Rule 23 by the process estab-
lished in the Rules Enabling Act, or if the five Justices who voted for
AT&T were to reject the advice of the Judicial Conference and its
Advisory Committees in regard to an amendment of the rule to
shield the aggregation of small claims, it would then be time for
deferential Congress to reconsider the Rules Enabling Act. Con-
gress should then reassert its indispensable role as a politically ac-
countable legislature to define the roles, powers, and
responsibilities of our legal institutions in enforcing the rights of
citizens and should, in this instance, diminish the role of the Court
and its subordinate Judicial Conference by itself enacting a law to
override the ruling in the Concepcion case.
Indeed, given the frequency with which the five Justices have dis-
played their hostility to the aims stated in Rule 1, Congress has an
immediate duty to address the problem by modifying the structure
of the Court. I have joined numerous others in urging Congress to
modify the law governing the Court.47 Congress has addressed the
problem of overbearing Justices before. David Currie describes a
time in which the rage of Federalists and Democrats resulted in a
45. See Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
46. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711-1715 (2006); see also Georgene Vairo, The Complete
CAFA: Analysis and Development Under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, in MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACrICE (2011).
47. See REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTiCES (Paul D. Car-
rington & Roger C. Cramton eds., 2006).
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change in the number of Justices. 48 Again, during the Civil War the
size of the Court was enlarged to prevent Justices favoring slavery
from having their way.49 Of course, there was 1937, when the Presi-
dent's "Court-packing" proposal resulted in the "switch that saved
nine."50 Such a modification of the Court is now very much in
need.5'
48. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD,
1789-1801, 198-200 (1997).
49. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 155-58 (1993).
50. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENRURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL:
1932-1940, at 232 passim (1963).
51. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (2011).
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